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In Caspar Hare's theory of perspectival realism, there is a defining ''intrinsic'' property that the things that are in perceptual awareness have. Consider seeing object A but not object B. Of course, we can say that the visual experience of A is present ''to you'', and no visual experience of B is present ''to you''. But, it can be argued, this misses the fact that the visual experience of A is ''simply'' present, not relative to anything. This is what Hare's perspectival realism attempts to capture, resulting in a weak version of metaphysical solipsism. As Hare points out, the same type of argument is often used in the philosophy of time to support theories such as presentism. Of course, we can say that A is happening on (today's date ). But, it can be argued, this misses the fact that A is ''simply'' happening (right now), not relative to anything. Hare's theory of perspectival realism is closely related to his theory of egocentric presentism. Several other philosophers have written reviews of Hare's work on this topic. ==See also== * Centered worlds * Benj Hellie's vertiginous question 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「perspectival realism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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